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ABSTRACT: What is neo-liberalism? I’m going to affirm here that, as well as being a political doctrine born 
in the 1970s, neo-liberalism is the construction, the extension and the final reinforcement of a number of 
classical elements. My argument is that many of the typical aspects of contemporary neo-liberalism were 
already present in theories expressed by thinkers such as L. von Mises and F. A. von Hayek. As proof of this 
fact, I reclaim some characteristics of the present neo-liberal phenomenon as having been conceived by 
the above authors. These characteristics actually imply the ongoing spread of a dominant ideology that 
tends to pit the concept of liberty against those of rationality and critical consciousness. First, the article 
will analyse the changes that have occurred within the phenomenon of consumerism, which becomes en-
twined with the competitive and entrepreneurial spirit of the individual; second, it will reflect on the wide-
spread aversion to socialist policies, and in fact to all policies that provide for public intervention by the 
State and that change the relationship between State and economy; finally, it will relate these investiga-
tions to the ideological and structural model that supports the European Union. 
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1. The new neo-liberalist tradition 
 
In the study of neo-liberalism, we must consider the connection between our pre-
sent economic paradigm, and its past. We do this largely within the contemporary so-
ciological literature, although this literature is mostly focused on theories that have 
been formulated since the 1970s. There is no doubt about the decisive influence of the 
Chicago School, and in particular of Friedman, who made dominant the neo-liberalist 
logic through publications, television presence, think tanks and other strategies to 
shape the collective consciousness, starting from the 1970s. Nevertheless, it seems to 
me that the contribution of prior theories to the birth of this logic has been underval-
ued, as in the case of the authors of the Austrian School. Too often, this school’s theo-
ries have been considered complementary to the ones that came after. Their role has 
been minimised and marginalised in comparison to the Chicago School’s more popular 
and analyzed theories. I have no intention to undervalue the decisive function of the 
Chicago School in the construction of the neo-liberalist collective consciousness of the 
1970s, but I want to reconsider the former theories of L. von Mises and F. A. von Hayek 
as contributive to or even constitutive of this consciousness.  
Today’s neo-liberalist paradigm is innovatively and extensively using concepts and 
theories developed by the economic thinkers of the Austrian School during the 1930s 
and 1940s. Therefore, neo-liberalism can be viewed as the construction, the extension, 
and the final reinforcement of a number of classical elements that had already been 
theorised, even if an embryonic way. According to the exponents of the Austrian 
School, the main constitutive elements of that economic model were extreme compe-
tition and deployment of decision capability. Their reasoning was that these elements 
are used by individuals to differentiate themselves: to craft a more distinct definition of 
their identities. This vision reveals a clear antagonism toward the socialist model, 
which was thought as a limiting and coercive model concerning self-determination. In 
its, particular, resilient  radicalisation of the idea of freedom, the model is clearly dif-
ferent from the one proposed, for example, by the Enlightenment – and by Gramsci – 
that considered freedom as critical awareness and humanistic maturation. It is also dif-
ferent from the liberal model, which is based only on the claiming of rights connected 
to ‘freedom of owning’, prior it is in private ownership. By contrast, the theorists of the 
Austrian School subordinate freedom – particularly political freedom – to economic 
freedom, theorising, at the same time, the reduction of the State to an ancillary role 
with respect to the market and its needs. In other words, for the Austrian researchers, 
“freedom” is synonymous with “market freedom”, and this is the reason why they con-
ceived of society wholly as an environment in which to form a new type of individual 
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whose modus vivendi, characterised by self-entrepreneurship and the [unceasing] ac-
quisition of resources, aims principally at success in a regime of competition. 
My idea is that these features of the model of capitalism, theorised at the time by 
the researchers of the Austrian School and faintly resonating still, are identical to those 
in the model under deployment nowadays almost everywhere in the western world 
and actively favoured by the neo-liberalist paradigm. The obvious implication of this 
strong resemblance is that we can analyse many social, political and economic con-
temporary phenomena as beginning from the theoretical positions expressed at the 
dawn of the twentieth century. This is true for at least three fields of study:  
a) the analysis of the present consumer phenomenon and the regulatory role of the 
market in people’s daily lives; 
b) the analysis of the current task of the State and its place inside the new political 
and social world order; and 
c) the study of the economic and political system on which the European Union is 
based.  
Through this analysis, we will see how Hayek’s and Mises’ ideas shadow all three 
fields: theorising a market that forms and governs the entire society; formulating an 
idea of State that raises this public institution to the status of guard of the neo-
liberalist system and diminishes the ideology of socialist politics; and extending liberal-
ist ideas from the national to the supranational (the European Union), ostensibly with 
the aim of limiting State sovereignty. 
 
 
2. The inception and spread of neo-liberalist precepts 
 
We can claim that the birth of neo-liberalist thought corresponds exactly with the 
end of the Lippmann Colloquium, which was organised by Louis Rougier in August 
1938, and whose results led to a clear dissociation from classical liberal thought.  
The meeting was born of the need to reconstruct the liberal doctrine in a theoretical 
way, in order to obtain a politics that could limit the disadvantages of laissez-faire. Ef-
fectively, the Lippmann Colloquium aided the inception of a reinvented liberalism, af-
terwards called new liberalism (Dardot and Laval 2013 [2009], chap. 2).  
According to Foucault (2008 [2004], 160-161), the importance of the Colloquium to 
the history of modern and contemporary neo-liberalism is also in its crossing of differ-
ent theoretical positions. The contribution proceeded respectively from traditional lib-
eralism, from the ordoliberalism of Röpke and Rüstow, and, of course, from the Austri-
an School, in particular Hayek and Mises.  
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Foucault also reminds us how, during the Colloquium, the participants presciently 
talked about a self-regulating market, where in there should not be any interruption of 
flow imposed by the State or by any kind of moralism. In that situation, with his formu-
lation of “catallactics”, Mises imagined and described a society based on self-
determination and entrepreneurship. Afterwards, those ideas would act as mediation 
between the German ordoliberalism and the American neo-liberalism, leading to the 
anarcho-liberalism of the Chicago School and particularly of Friedman (ivi, 161).  
Nowadays these ideas are fully deployed in western society, most obviously since 
the 1970s. In the 1950s and 1960s, due to force majeure, capitalism had to come to 
terms with a new working class, grown stronger after the war and with competition be-
tween systems; the result was the acceptance of Keynesian policies (Streeck 2014 
[2013]). The new world order – shaped from the Bretton Woods system and the crea-
tion of new institutions such as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund 
and the Bank for International Settlements of Basil – would guarantee relative peace 
and quiet between nations for many years to come. In effect, in this renewed contest, 
the economic and political organisations of embedded liberalism recovered from the 
world war, working towards full employment rates, economic growth and citizens’ wel-
fare (Harvey 2007 [2005]). Through the instating of ‘social ownership’ (replacing some 
functions of ‘private ownership’), post war society embarked on a nascent system of 
social protection. Eventually, the fusion of capitalism and established sociopolitical 
aims permitted a transformation of the entire society, which became – according to 
Castel (2003, 33) –  a “société de semblables”.  
But, in the 1970s, the fiscal crisis intervened in this postwar landscape of the forced 
public regulation of capitalism. This is the moment when the features of turbo-
capitalism, rampant today and already delineated by the researchers of the Austrian 
School, became more and more evident. The fiscal crisis downsized the Keynesian poli-
cies, which began to be deliberately thwarted by measures intended to downsize the 
welfare state. Some examples of structural changes that have intervened since the 
1970s as direct attacks on the welfare state system are: reduction of the rights to be 
protected from dismissal; authorisation and promotion of underpaid forms of em-
ployment; privatisation of public services in order to reduce public employment; reduc-
tion of the cost of labour; inflation at a greater rate than increase in wages; attacks on 
unions and their consequent exclusion from pay bargaining; and outsourcing of pro-
duction to places in the world where pay is lower (Gallino 2005, 99; Streeck 2014 
[2013], 41-41).  
The anti-welfare theories of the Chicago School, and particularly of Friedman, circu-
lated during the 1970s, were decisive for the political choices of the Thatcher and 
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Reagan’ governments in the 1980s (see Friedman 1982 [1962]; ID. 1980 [1979]). As an 
example, we can review Friedman’s position on the issue of politics against poverty: 
 
the liberal will therefore distinguish sharply between equality of rights and equality of 
opportunity, on the one hand, and material equality or equality of outcome on the other. 
He may welcome the fact that a free society in fact tends toward greater material equali-
ty than any other yet tried. But he will regard this as a desirable by-product of a free so-
ciety, not its major justification. He will welcome measures that promote both freedom 
and equality — such as measures to eliminate monopoly power and to improve the op-
eration of the market. He will regard private charity directed at helping the less fortunate 
as an example of the proper use of freedom. And he may approve state action toward 
ameliorating poverty as a more effective way in which the great bulk of the community 
can achieve a common objective. He will do so with regret, however, at having to substi-
tute compulsory for voluntary action (Friedman 1982 [1962], 195). 
 
According to this point of view, it is the duty of each single individual to voluntarily, 
and preeminently, think about the wealth of the collective above his/her own wealth. 
This simple idea would become the focal point of government political propaganda 
during the 1970s and 1980s. The support of poor people would be the responsibility of 
voluntary charitable actions and organisations, not of a compulsory tax-funded effort  
by the State. At the same time, the theory criticized public housing, legislation of mini-
mum wage, nationalisation of the retirement system, and mandatory pension contribu-
tions (ivi, chap. 11). Individual freedom became an opportunity for those who could af-
ford it (others would have to try to gain it, devoting themselves to acquiring more and 
more skills). 
The Chicago School of economics managed to spread these principles until they be-
came real politics. But the origin of these ideas lies somewhere else. I believe that it is 
possible to find it in Mises’ and Hayek’s works, which strongly supported the subordi-
nation of social systems to market logic. Of course, the neo-liberalist perspective elab-
orated by these two authors was embryonic. Looking back superficially on all the socio-
economic changes that occurred in the intervening decades, we might have the sensa-
tion that the contemporary scene is far more enveloped by market logic than the Aus-
trian School economists would have hoped. 
Today, the flexibility and uncertainty of what Beck (1992 [1986]) calls the “global risk 
society” – the consequence of the real reduction of welfare policies – have over-
whelmed individuals, who are stranded by the pitiless politics of capitalism (Gallino 
2011). Diffusion of financial activities throughout the economic system is how capital-
ism chooses to deal with its frequent crises. Factors that permit capitalism to buy time 
(Streeck 2013) include governmental borrowing, the extension of private credit and the 
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acquisition of public debt by central banks. Moreover, capitalism employs efficient so-
cial instruments to build consensus in order to stay alive: being also a kind of culture, it 
has expanded and radicalised itself thanks to an intentional ideology that sustains its 
action. Besides classical forms of propaganda (mass media, educational institution, 
building of public opinion, etc.), capitalism is using new and more complex forms of 
‘narration’, whose intention is to gain people’s agreement and to spread the idea that 
capitalism is the best of the possible worlds (Harvey 2007 [2005]). To this end, capital-
ism is also using specialized forms of communication and specific machineries to dis-
seminate ideology, such as new Research Centers that are scientific only by definition, 
being specifically created to spread ‘belief’ in capitalism on a public level. Among them, 
one of the most famous is certainly the neo-conservative Freedom House, founded in 
1941 to measure ‘democracy’, which concept was mitigated over time to denote an 
unspecific ‘freedom’  rather than equality or social justice (Giannone 2010). Hayek him-
self had the distinction of founding similar centers, all in favour of the liberal market 
(ivi, chap. 1), among them the Institute of Economic Affairs in London in 1955 and the 
Fraser Institute in Vancouver in 1974.Together with Röpke he founded the Mont Peler-
in Society, whose importance in the spread of neo-liberalist ideas is well-known and 
fully analyzed by Mirowki (2009) in The Road from Mont Pèlerin: The Making of the 
Neoliberal Thought Collective. The Mont Pelerin Society has by now lost its influence, 
but it is still acting as a kind of ideologic  “bridge” between its founder’s thought and 
that of the ensuing Chicago School.  
From 1970 onward, political support and ideological legitimation for the newly 
founded neo-liberalist paradigm increased. In 1971, Lewis Powell was appointed as a 
member of the Supreme Court by Richard Nixon. He worked to strengthen the fact that 
one of the aims of the National Chamber of Commerce was to influence, in a more sub-
stantial and pushy way, institutions such as universities, schools, media outlets, pub-
lishing houses and law courts, in order to change the individuals’ opinions about the 
big firms and the market (Harvey 2007 [2005], 43). In the 70s, many public figures  
guided public opinion toward a renewed embrace of capitalism. For example, Fried-
man, who was Hayek’s pupil, published articles and books, and appeared on TV pro-
grams, with the aim of gaining a new consensus in favour of the market. At the same 
time, he negatively stigmatised the public role of the State (Dardot and Laval 2013 
[2009], 180). Harvey (2007 [2005], 44) documents the fact that from one of Friedman’s 
books, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement, a TV program was made that was sup-
ported by Scaife, one of the many foundations aiming to spreading the neo-liberalist 
ideology.  
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Influencing political debate, there was in the 1970s a widespread and fundamental 
rise in neo-liberalist support. New ‘think tanks’ such as the Heritage Foundation, the 
Hoover Institute, the Center for the Study of American Business, the American Enter-
prise Institute and the National Bureau of Economic Research were born. All these in-
stitutions tended to corroborate and propagate neo-liberalist concept.  
This thorough spread certainly contributed to the inception of the TINA (there is no 
alternative) logic, according to which neo-liberalism represents the only solution to 
human progress. TINA logic had its international consecration with the institution of 
the International Democrat Union (IDU) in 1983. This Union’s intention was to compete 
ideologically with the big ‘internationals’ of history: Communist (Komintern, created in 
1919) and Liberal (IL, Liberal International, created in 1947). Whereas the latter under-
line issues of social justice, poverty and community, and issues of the market, the IDU 
centers rather on the individual, free enterprise, open trade, minimalist government 
and private owners ship. Its separation from the liberal issues of social justice, together 
with the universalist claim of its values, continue to increase (Giannone 2010, chap. 1). 
Despite the neo-liberalist explosion during the 1970s, there exists, I will claim, a tight 
link back to the theories of the authors of the Austrian School. We could say that their 
theories lit the fuse of the neo-liberalist bomb, which was to explode years later thanks 
to its fueling by the economic theories of the Chicago School. 
 
 
3. The evolution of consumerism: from the liberalist to the neo-liberalist 
model 
 
Another tenet contributing to the worldwide spread and growth of neo-liberalist 
capitalism has been ‘consumerism’ (as it was for liberalism). Deeply rooted since the 
dawn of the industrial revolution (see Sombart 1986 [1902]), consumerism has gradual-
ly expanded until it has reached the present phase, called “hyperconsumerism” by 
Ritzer (2005 [1999]). The economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s formed the basis for 
a consumerism which became exponentially progressive and unstoppable. The thinkers 
of the Frankfurt School described its extension in detail; according to them, consumer-
ism was fed by “false needs” and delineated in order to reproduce the capitalistic sys-
tem (Marcuse 2002 [1964]). Through the fostering of a “fun industry”, capitalism ap-
propriated people’s free time and substituted “authentic ” culture with culture that 
was prepackaged and projected (Pasolini, 1976). On this point, Baudrillard (1996 
[1968]) had a more caustic opinion: he noted that the consumer had become a worker 
that didn’t know he was working. Deviating from Marxist ideology, Baudrillard meant 
that capitalistic exploitation was not limited to the space of the factory, but had en-
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tered the daily life of the populace. Debord (1995 [1967]) has a similar opinion: he 
thinks that, thanks to contemporary mass media and advertising consumerism is able 
to reach everyone’s consciousness at every moment and everywhere, making the 
world “spectacular”. For all these authors, the consumerism has become a total phe-
nomenon embracing the whole individuals experience, it influencing consumers to con-
tinually seek solutions to superfluous ‘needs’. According to Ritzer (2005 [1999], 9), in 
order to satisfy this compulsion special cult places, the “cathedrals of consumption”, 
constructed. These are spaces of anonymity adapted to foster and facilitate feverish 
buying. In Ritzer’s opinion (ivi, 29-30) “hyperconsumistic” logic is paradoxically demo-
cratic: the new technological and communication instruments, such as social networks 
and smartphones, don’t  exclude anyone. The simplicity of consumerism’s ability to 
penetrate all individuals’ daily lives recalls those original features, discussed above, of a 
consumerist model that we could define as ‘ liberalist ’.  
Cultural and social reproduction of capitalism via the capillary ‘invasion’ of consum-
erism has been happening since the 1970s. In effect, what consumerism is doing now-
adays is actually spreading the machinery of competition in order to germinate the be-
haviour of single entrepreneurship or, as termed by Dardot and Laval (2013 [2009], 
293), the bahaviour of “self-help”.  
This concept proposes that the individual-entrepreneur does not have – or should 
not have – any other means than herself or himself. A process began during the 1970s 
that worked for a gradual elimination of welfare services provided by the State; accord-
ing to its neo-liberalist ideology, State welfare systems are to be blamed for encourag-
ing the laziness of poverty. However, unavoidable consequences of this process are 
lonely and abandoned subjects dependent only on their own professionalism and 
obliged to continuously demonstrate their knowledge so that no one can outstrip 
them. According to Sennett (1998), the removal of excessive bureaucratic constraints 
on firms, and their reorganisation into more flexible forms, favoured this state of lone-
liness, partly because it was easier to expunge redundancies from the productive are-
na. Exclusion from the labour market of those without their own and renewable means 
intensifies a competitive spirit, and as this spirit becomes widespread we must adapt to 
the new situation. This competitive spirit is the fundamental element of the new con-
sumer model. 
The features of this new model, briefly underlined here, bear close relation to those 
that Mises and Hayek theorised in the 1930s and 1940s. Although their theories came 
alive during the period of the economic boom of mass consumerism (and in a different 
socio-economic context from the present one), these Austrian School authors delineat-
ed the essential elements of what we can now call a neo-liberalist consumer model. For 
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example, in his most famous text, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Mises talks 
about the individual-consumer’s personal choices. According to his vision, the subject – 
in a state of autarchy – would naturally be able to carry out market actions. Then the 
market, rendering rational what actors choose, would assume the role of formative 
agent. In other words, for Mises, the subject has the capability to (gradually) determine 
the market’s prices and its functional laws, so that the market is a “social body”, always 
changing, “that results from everyone’s active participation” (Mises 1998 [1949], 312). 
In his words:  
 
The market is not a place, a thing, or a collective entity. The market is a process, actu-
ated by the interplay of the actions of the various individuals cooperating under the divi-
sion of labor. The forces determining the – continually changing – state of the market are 
the value judgments of these individuals and their actions as directed by these value 
judgements. The state of the market at any instant is the price structure, i.e., the totality 
of the exchange ratios as established by the interaction of those eager to buy and those 
eager to sell. There is nothing inhuman or mystical with regard to the market. The mar-
ket process is entirely a resultant of human actions. Every market phenomenon can be 
traced back to definite choices of the members of the market society (ivi, 258-259). 
 
According to Mises, the market operates like the democratic constitution. If we as-
sume (or recognise) that the citizens have the capability and the sovereignty of judging 
the government’s behaviour, the same would apply to consumers in the market. There-
fore in his thinking, every cent spent by a consumer is equivalent to a vote in a democ-
racy (ivi, 271). Moreover, Mises allows that there is a greater attention to minorities in 
the market than in a social democracy, because its producers do not want to exclude 
their desires and needs. In other words, as in a parliamentary democracy, the market’s 
entrepreneurs are virtually the consumers’ mandataries (ivi, 272), perhaps having even 
more relevance than their elected representatives. Consumers, through their buying or 
their abstention, lend their place and their weight in society to various entrepreneurs. 
Mises describes this process: 
 
Entrance into a definite branch of industry is virtually free to newcomers only as far as 
the consumers approve of this branch’s expansion or as far as the newcomers succeed in 
supplanting those already occupied in it by filling better or more cheaply the demands of 
the consumers. Additional investment is reasonable only to the extent that it fills the 
most urgent among the not yet satisfied needs of the consumers. If the existing plants 
are sufficient, it would be wasteful to invest more capital in the same industry. The struc-
ture of market prices pushes the new investors into other branches (ivi, 275). 
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Differently from “biological competition”, where in the natural rivalry among ani-
mals looking for food is “hostile”, for Mises (ivi, 274) “social competition” a result of 
the social cooperation system in the division of labour, is the outflow of participation 
and mutuality. This type of competition is possible only when the market does not suf-
fer external interferences and when everyone has the possibility to act freely toward 
reaching economic and social objectives. Mises defines this type of competition as 
“catallatics”. Offering relatively more or less beneficial and convenient products and 
services, sellers are mutually exclusive; meanwhile buyers are prepared to offer more 
or less, and to marginalize those whose offerings are not desired (ibidem). In catallactic 
competition, the human agent influences the market and the market, in turn, shapes 
people’s actions. Subjects bias the market depending on the presence of unsatisfied 
needs, but in this way, everyone becomes a potential entrepreneur, incessantly and 
obsessively honing self-assertiveness (for shadowing the present phenomena of the 
prosumer1). The market regulator principle is upturned: it does not turn on the simple 
exchange of goods, but on the spread of the “mechanisms of competition” (Foucault 
2008 [2004], 147). This is the inception of the neo-liberalist consumer model. 
In this complex new design of the market logic, the concept of freedom changes too. 
Now it aligns with a particular aspect – competition, and with a particular feature –
egoism (Mises 1998 [1949], 283). Its legitimacy can be considered a change from the 
old liberalist consumer model. For the researchers of the Austrian School, modern 
complexity led to a reconsideration of moral principles, so that Hayek thought about 
these principles as limits (Hayek 2004 [1944], 61). He believed that the inclination to-
ward a total satisfaction of one’s needs leads to a demolition of socialist moral princi-
ples, characterised by equalitarianism. In Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Mis-
es also expresses this idea. He writes that if the entrepreneurs’ task is to offer a speci-
fied and required series of products to satisfy consumers’ needs, this also means that 
they do not have any moral responsibility regarding what they are offering. Convinced 
that “man is not evil merely because he wants to enjoy pleasure and avoid pain” (1951 
[1922], 453), Mises reaffirms the utilitarian logic, while eliminating all its negative fea-
 
1  ‘Prosumer’ is a term coined by Toffler in his text The Third Wave (1989). It is the result of the crasis of 
the terms producer and consumer. The term describes consumers’ attention-seeking behaviour in a period 
emerging from the first period of massive serial production servicing the multiple consumption needs of 
citizens. The web sites that absorb clients’ reactions are an example of prosumer behaviour: browsers, 
where visitors’ activity is determining and fixing the prices of the advertisements; e-commerce sites, 
where the sellers’ and products’ reputations are built by the judgments of former users; blogs; wiki sites 
crafted by the active collaboration of the community and its users. Prosumer television, by inviting com-
mon people to participate in reality shows, has also tried to downsize the threshold that divides public 
from producer. 
Vanessa Lamattina, The old neo-liberalism 
349 
 
tures. In order to understand his position we should note that  for Mises commercial 
propaganda was nothing more than a neutral competitive instrument used by the en-
trepreneur to reach a valid aim. 
 
Business propaganda must be obtrusive and blatant. It is its aim to attract the atten-
tion of slow people, to rouse latent wishes, to entice men to substitute innovation for in-
ert clinging to traditional routine. In order to succeed, advertising must be adjusted to 
the mentality of the people courted. It must suit their tastes and speak their idiom. Ad-
vertising is shrill, noisy, coarse, puffing, because the public does not react to dignified al-
lusions. It is the bad taste of the public that forces the advertisers to display bad taste in 
their publicity campaigns (Mises 1998 [1949], 316-317). 
 
This example demonstrates the difference between neo-liberalist consumer theory 
and Marcusian ‘false needs’ theory. On one hand, there is the Frankfurt view of the 
subjected rationality of individuals that suffer media and advertisement as something 
that invades their private space and demands their alignment with capitalistic logic. On 
the other hand, there are the ante-litteram Austrian neo-liberalist economists who as-
sert instead the existence of a perfect rationality that inheres in the capability of the 
subject to choose competently in a world of alternative products.  
 
 
4. The new function of the State and the neo-liberalist aversion for the wel-
fare policies 
 
According to Foucault (2008 [2004], 147), in the neo-liberalist paradigm we try to go 
back to a kind of social ethics whose political, cultural and economic history has already 
been traced by thinkers such as Weber, Schumpeter and Sombart. Based on the as-
sumption – already fully explained by researchers such as Samuelson (1947) and Arrow 
and Debreu (1950) in their models of competitive economy – that market logic is the 
only logic that can guarantee the freedom of the individual, neo-liberalism has the ob-
jective of prohibiting external market forces that could act to limit its power. Based on 
this assumption, during the 1970s, the classical relation between State and economy 
was completely redefined. Firstly, welfare policies that aimed to restore the social 
State role were considered damaging and superfluous. The gradual elimination of 
Keynesian policies during this period led to their substitution by market politics that did 
not allow interference from the State. As we have seen, a series of actions was taken to 
serve to this objective: from the reduction of the right to be protected from dismissal, 
to the authorization and promotion of underpaid forms of employment; from attacks 
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on Unions and their consequent exclusion from pay bargaining, to the outsourcing of 
production to places in the world where pay is lower (Streeck 2014 [2013], Gallino 
2005, 99). What I want to underline here is how neo-liberalists acted with the deliber-
ate intention of modifying the classical function of social defense by the State, in ser-
vice of the advancement of market logic. Neo-liberalist politics do not prefigure a total 
elimination of State intervention and return to classical laissez-faire logic, but a re-
definition of its tasks. In fact, the State has to become itself neo-liberalist, an apparatus 
that derives its own legitimacy from its protection of the functioning of the free mar-
ket. The theoretical concepts formulated by Mises and Hayek tend toward this re fig-
uration of the role held by the State, and they can be used here to understand the pre-
sent neo-liberalist paradigm.  
According to van Dijk (1998), all ideology contributes to the production of duel signi-
fications that are translated into antagonism between “we”, right and truthful, and 
“they”, bad and liars. From this perspective, Mises’ and Hayek’s stances on socialism 
represent ideology stances. There is no doubt that the historical context in which the 
Austrian School researchers operated – circa 1944, when Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom 
and Mises’ Omnipotent Government: The Rise of Total State and Total War were pub-
lished –  favoured certain considerations. In these texts there are explicit parallelisms 
with dictatorships (such as Nazism and Fascism) and with socialist policies. Even where 
these parallelisms are not explicit, they are still present implicitly.  
Mises believed that, market society is self-regulating. Via the subjectivism inherent 
in catallactic competition, the market forms individuals and simultaneously provides 
their context. From this point of view, there is no space for socialism or any other type 
of intervention. For Mises any point of interaction between the market and socialist 
system is not possible or even thinkable; production must be led only by the market. 
Therefore, there is no space for a mixed economy, for a partly capitalist and a partly 
socialist system (Mises 1998 [1949], 259). Hayek adds another element to this analysis. 
He maintains that it is modernity itself that makes more complex the division of labour 
and more difficult the task of controlling all the relevant facts, in order to reach a “syn-
optic view” (Hayek 2006 [1944], 51). In Hayek’s theory of knowledge, centralised plan-
ning would be useless because of the need for  decentralisation, necessary to handle 
modern complexity. Because different agents have to be free to adapt their activity to 
facts known only by themselves, their co-existence can be realised only through the 
demolition of all centralised control, and through a price system based on the competi-
tion regime (ibidem). To sum up, in such a complex system as the modern one, the only 
way to coordinate individuals is to let them adapt to the price system that becomes 
“the impersonal mechanism for transmitting the relevant information” (ivi, 52).  
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The inability of State planning to satisfy the multiple needs of the complex modern 
system is due to the fact that it can maintain only one plan at a time, involving the 
elimination of any other plan (Mises 2010 [1944], 242). By contrast to the market 
economy, socialism favours a concentration of power that infringes everyone’s right to 
self-determination. And the evident paradoxical consequence is the impossibility of the 
realisation of the socialist system. 
Mises (1951 [1922], 451; 2010 [1944], 54-55) maintains that socialism cannot pro-
vide a real economic calculation so that, together with interventionism, etatism and 
nationalism, it can only remain a myth. Being unable to provide an economic calcula-
tion, socialism tries to demonstrate its ideas through the moralisation of the society 
(Mises 1951 [1922], 451). This tendency to moralising becomes its own worst enemy. 
Hayek (2006 [1944], 61-62) proclaims that the development of civilisation has led to a 
decrease of the rules that constitute our common moral system, and that therefore the 
socialist attempt to create an economic plan based on common moral principles (like 
altruism) is failing. In complex modern society, where individualism leads everyone to 
have a personal scale of values and to act according to personal needs (ivi, 62), both 
the presuppositions of the socialist system and its criticism of individualism are disas-
trous (Mises 1951 [1922], 452).  
The defense of individualism as a fundamental value of modernity has to pass 
through the State, and the Austrian researchers purported that the likelihood of its to-
tal inaction or laissez faire in the face of this force of change is nil. The State has to suf-
fer a deep change. There is not only the need for a reduction of its function, but of a 
shift in the direction of its internal objectives. The State has to support market politics 
through a rule system, having as it does the task of safeguarding private ownership, 
and also the health, the life and the functioning of the market (Mises 2010 [1944], 
138).  
Issues of the State role inside the neo-liberalist framework acquire a great im-
portance on these points. In the chapter Planning and the Rule of Law (2006 [1944], 
chap. 6) in Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom, he reflects on the issue of the rule of law. He 
maintains that, in a liberalist society, individuals should have the ability to predict State 
action, in order to use this knowledge like data on the basis of which they can create 
their own plans. This is the only way in which the State can abide by liberalist principles 
– the only way it can guarantee freedom and take steps to foster he individual’s 
wealth. It has to apply constant, predictable and general laws in order to promote indi-
vidual interest. Specifically, if the constitutional State wants to work inside the eco-
nomic order, it has to formulate laws that are formal and that do not interfere at any 
juncture in the economic game, establishing what is more or less right for collective 
welfare. It must avoid domination of the economical process from above, and must 
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leave this process to follow its own flow inside the formal juridical frame (ibidem). Ac-
cording to this vision, the economy is a game and the juridical institution is the rule of 
the game (Foucault 2008 [2004], 173). The actors in the game are still the individuals 
and the financial firms, and it is up to them to create the most rational frameworks in 
which to each achieve their distinct aims. Therefore, a renewed liberalism renders 
emergent multiple individual objectives, and precludes the State from controlling the 
resources of the society (Hayek 2006 [1944], chap. 6). 
 
 
5. The European Union as neo-liberalist instrument 
 
The study of neo-liberalism, as an economic and ideologic project, is necessary 
inproviding a frame for the present European situation and an informed perspective on 
its problems. I asserts that through the lens of Mises’ and Hayek’s theories it is possible 
to read the limits of the European construction and to view how the European Union 
has become an instrument for the final consolidation of liberalist principles. In effect, 
the economic and ideologic order upon which the has been based since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall in 1989 seems to fully reflect the ideal federation as thought by Hayek. 
Staying true to what it has been since 1993 – an economic community (Enzesberger 
2013 [2011]) – the European Union still faces obstacles arising from the inability to 
achieve a  European 'demos'  that operates beyond economic interests. 
I have already remarked how the Keynesian policies upon which the newborn Eu-
rope was based crumbled in favour of liberalist politics during the 1970s. According to 
Streeck (2014 [2013]), since World War II neo-liberalism has become absolutely the 
most important engine of the European economy, dissolving national power and re-
ducing the assistance and safety level that the social States guaranteed to their citi-
zens. European citizens have found themselves more and more alone in dealing with 
the risks of the new society, without the lively presence of any national State as a guar-
antor for their social rights. The European Union has been oriented mostly towards 
‘austerity’ politics and based on stability pacts, rather than guaranteeing its citizens as-
sistance. In this way it has developed progressively more rules supporting capitalist 
economic principles. For Streeck, the common social and political space is modelled 
more and more on a logic that defends “market justice” over “social justice” –  a kind 
of “hayekization of the European capitalism” (ibidem). According to this view, govern-
ments conformed to market needs, capitulating to the authority of the European Court 
of Justice which, to promote free movement of services and capital, handed down 
many verdicts that undermined workers’ rights to co-determination and to strike 
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(ibidem). Moreover, the monetary union makes it impossible to amend the existing 
rules, disadvantaging the weakest countries’ economies. These found themselves in 
trouble and had to apply internal devaluation politics, pay cuts, social benefit cuts, la-
bour flexibility and so on: features characteristic of the present European model. These 
features patently reflect what Hayek imagined as basic regulations for the future Euro-
pean federation.  
The Austrian School elaborated their theoretical concepts inside an historical con-
text. This context influenced their reflections about the most propitious conditions for 
the creation of an international order characterised by peace. For example, Hayek’s 
1939 essay The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism and Mises’ 1944 text The 
Omnipotent Government  both work from the assumption that the inception of a global 
society of mutual trade of goods and services can be the basis for a pacific cohesion 
among States and nations (Mises 2010 [1944], 122). Starting from the presupposition 
that in a planned economy everyone has to obey an established will that follows a sub-
jective moral order, both theorists arrive at the conclusion that socialism is a totally 
improper means by which to reach pacific cooperation (ivi, 242). According to Hayek, 
the complexity of modern society will not admit the pacific coexistence of people in-
side a unique moral and economic scheme, as the socialist regime wished. 
Despite their refusal of the idea of a social matrix of State control, Mises and Hayek 
are conscious that the creation of a federation of States implies inevitably the idea of 
unanimity. Their opinion is that we do not have to produce this unanimity in a unifying 
vision, as proposed by socialism, but instead in a unique economic order that guaran-
tees the maintenance of internal differences. And that’s why the creation of a liberalist 
federation represents for them the only solution. According to them, it is only in feder-
ation with an economic order based on the free trade of goods, people and capitals 
that we can weather  nationalism – perceived by them as a direct consequence of so-
cialism. Through free trade practices, it is possible to avoid, inside the federation, the 
creation of “solidarities of interests” among some member States to others States’ dis-
advantage (Hayek 1939, 256-257) and it is also possible to ward off conflicts, wars and 
totalitarian oppressions (Mises 2010 [1944], 93). 
Hayek (1939, 261-262) extended his reflections to predict the consequences of a lib-
eralist economic order inside the European federation. In his opinion, this order would 
be able to strongly limit national sovereignty and its consequent nationalism because 
the federation forbids each State to continue in the promotion of a national currency 
politics. Moreover, opening the borders and facilitating people’s movement within the 
federation makes it more difficult for the States to tax their own citizens. For Hayek, 
the transference of possible market regulator politics from the States to the federation 
is completely useless and deleterious. The supranational membership ties that should 
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support the new task are too weak, and risk reduction of the supranational power, as 
well as of the discrete national powers. Hayek’s (ivi, 256) conclusion is that if the objec-
tive is to realise a federation, it is necessary to have “less government”. 
The European Union, as plotted out by Hayek, is a simple set of economic policies ra-
ther than a place to share values and ideals. His supposition is primarily about the role 
of the federation in the economic game. If we configure his analysis to the present 
economic order of the European Union, we realise how farsighted the Austrian re-
searchers were. We can read the EU as using the neo-liberalist model to root its eco-
nomic policies, and the outsourcing phenomenon both as one of the most patently 
clear manifestations of a targeted opening of the national borders, and as a practical 
new proposition regarding the Hayekenian theory about limiting State power.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
In this article I firstly sketched the passage from liberalism to neo-liberalism that 
transpired during the 1930s, perhaps starting from the Lippmann Colloquium. Organ-
ised in 1938, this was the first occasion for a delineation of the characteristic features 
of a reinvented liberalism. The presence of exponents of traditional liberalism, of 
ordoliberalism and of the Austrian School theories gave life to a complex discussion re-
garding the prospective features of this new liberalism (Dardot and Laval 2013 [2009], 
chap. 2; Foucault 2008 [2004], 160-161). I have stressed the theoretical concepts for-
mulated by two of the most influential exponents of the Austrian School, Mises and 
Hayek, and my main claim is that they perceptibly influenced the creation of the new 
neo-liberalist model that has been tangibly in evidence since the 1970s.  
In particular, I have underlined how these concepts have influenced three specific 
fields. First, the consumer phenomenon: these Austrian economists based their theo-
ries about capitalism on a subjectivist concept of reality, on the idea that the market 
forms and rules the entire society, and on the upturn in the roles of entrepreneur and 
consumer. In their view, consumers’ choices determine market prices, not the other 
way around; the theorists favour the inception of a competition called “catallactics” by 
Mises. This competition would tend toward eliminating those who do not adapt to the 
market, and toward supporting those who possess the right skills and assets to adapt. 
Consequently, the failure or the success of an entrepreneur depends directly on con-
sumers’ choice, because the consumers are the real sovereigns of the market and the 
absolute decision-makers of the economic luck of entrepreneurs who are reduced to 
market  servants (Mises 1998 [1949]). In this view, consumerism becomes an incessant 
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and anonymous force that pushes development of newer and newer products of ex-
change, pushing them into a market that no longer valorises its goods, but instead aims 
to stimulate “competition machineries” for bio-political effect (Foucault 2008 [2004], 
147). 
The second field is the State role. Mises’ and Hayek’s theories help us to understand 
the present function of the State inside the new neo-liberalist social political order. The 
neo-liberalist order arrives on the back of an ideological of socialist politics. This pro-
cess was already active in the theoretical formulation of the Austrian School, and it 
proceeds from the opinion that planned policies, such as socialist policies, are not able 
to preserve freedom, including market freedom. The State has to guarantee this condi-
tion of market freedom on the understanding that it reformulates its tasks. For exam-
ple, according to Hayek, in order to let the economic system work the State has to limit 
itself to being a grantor of formal laws that do not interfere at any point in the eco-
nomic game. Eschewing dominating  the economic process from above, and instead al-
lowing it to freely flow inside a formal  juridical frame, the State becomes subordinated 
to market logic and indirectly supports it (Hayek 2006 [1944], chap. 6). The State takes 
on a neo-liberalist function, because its intervention is required only as a defense of 
the principles of this order.  
Thirdly and finally, Hayek’s and Mises’ analyses are useful in clarifying the logic of 
the competition among States, as a possible condition for a durable and stable interna-
tional peace. In this sense, these authors extended the field of application of their ide-
as from the national field to the entire European federation, with the deliberate aim of 
limiting the national sovereignty of the local governments. Nowadays the European 
Union is very similar to the entity theorised by Mises and Hayek, regarding the limita-
tions of power that the national governments incurred a consequence of federation.  
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